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Abstract
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) [“Asset prices, nominal rigidities, and mon-
etary policy,” Review of Economic Dynamics 10, 256–275] find that mone-
tary policy response to share prices is a source of equilibrium indeterminacy
because an increase in inflation implies a high real marginal cost and low
share prices in a sticky-price economy. We find that if the New Keynesian
Phillips curve has a lagged inflation term caused by price indexation, this
eect is weakened. Moreover, equilibrium indeterminacy caused by mone-
tary policy response to share prices never arises if all the firms that cannot
re-optimize their prices follow price indexation.
Keywords: asset prices; monetary policy; equilibrium determinacy; price
indexation
JEL classification: E32; E44; E52
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1 Introduction
One of the classical topics in monetary policy is on the stance of a central bank on
asset price fluctuations. Japan’s experience of the boom during the late 1980s and
the long stagnation during the 1990s and the recent boom and bust experience of
the U.S. economy seem to imply that a central bank should respond to asset price
fluctuations.
Many researchers have investigated this topic. Bernanke and Gertler (2001)
and Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) find the unimportance of responding to asset
prices. Iacoviello (2005) shows that monetary policy response to asset prices gen-
erates welfare gain. Faia and Monacelli (2007) find that monetary policy should
negatively respond to asset prices.
A recent paper by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) provides a negative answer
to this question. They show that equilibrium indeterminacy arises if monetary
policy responds to share prices in a standard sticky-price economy. An increase in
inflation reduces firm’s profits, and the share prices decline since they reflect the
firm’s profits. Then, monetary policy response to share prices implicitly weakens
overall reactions to inflation. This is a source of equilibrium indeterminacy.
In this paper, we extend the model of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) by intro-
ducing price indexation and show that equilibrium determinacy is likely to arise.
Under price indexation, the New Keynesian Philips curve is hybrid and has a
lagged inflation term. It is shown that the eect of an increase in inflation on real
marginal costs is weakened through the hybrid Phillips curve. Moreover, equi-
librium indeterminacy caused by monetary policy response to share prices never
arises if all the firms that cannot re-optimize their prices follow price indexation.
An increase in inflation increases the real marginal cost under the sticky-price
setting without price indexation, since a fraction of firms cannot change their
prices. This increase in the real marginal cost implies low share prices. Then,
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monetary policy response to share prices implicitly weakens overall reactions to
inflation. Contrary to this, firms following price indexation can keep their real
marginal cost constant in the long run since the past inflation reflects this increase
in inflation.
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) emphasize the inflation persistence by empirical
analyses, and Gali and Gertler (1999) develop a model with the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve. Many state-of-the-art DSGE models a` la Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007) employ price in-
dexation. Therefore, it is important to consider the type of New Keynesian Phillips
curve used when we investigate the relationship between monetary policy and
share prices.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our model.
Section 3 presents the main results and their interpretation. Finally, Section 4
presents our concluding remarks.
2 The model
We employ a standard sticky-price model with shares, like Carlstrom and Fuerst
(2007). The dierence between our model and theirs is that we introduce price
indexation in sticky prices.
2.1 Households
The household begins period t with Mt cash balances, Bt one-period nominal
bonds that pay Rt 1 gross risk-free interest rate, S t shares of stock that sell at
price Qt.
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The utility function is
U
 
Ct; Ht;
Mt+1
Pt
!
=
C1 t
1      
H1+t
1 + 
+ V
 
Mt+1
Pt
!
; (1)
where  > 0,  > 0,  > 0, V() is increasing and concave, Ct denotes con-
sumption, Ht denotes labor supply, Pt denotes aggregate price level, and Mt+1=Pt
denotes real cash balances at the end of period t.
The budget constraint of household is
PtCt + Mt+1 + Bt+1 + PtQtS t+1
 PtWtHt + Mt + Rt 1Bt + Pt(Qt + Dt)S t + Xt; (2)
where Wt denotes wage rate, Dt denotes dividends of share, and Xt denotes mon-
etary injection.
The first order conditions of households are
Ct H

t = Wt; (3)
C t = C t+1 
Rt
t+1
; (4)
C t Qt = C t+1 [Qt+1 + Dt+1] ; (5)
where t+1  Pt+1=Pt denotes gross inflation. Equation (3) is the intratemporal
optimization condition, equation (4) is the Euler equation for consumption, and
equation (5) is the Euler equation for share.
Equation (5) can be rewritten as familiar asset prices equations:
Qt =

Qt+1 + Dt+1

t+1
Rt
: (6)
2.2 Firms
There are monopolistically competitive intermediate-goods firms and competitive
final-goods firms.
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The production technology of final-goods firms is
Yt =
 Z 1
0
Yt(i)  1 di
! 
 1
; (7)
where  denotes the elasticity of substitution and Yt(i) denotes outputs of intermediate-
goods indexed by i. The profit maximization of final-goods firms implies the de-
mand curve for Yt(i) as
Yt(i) =
 
Pt(i)
Pt
! 
Yt; (8)
where Pt(i) denotes the price level of intermediate-goods indexed by i. Combining
equations (7) and (8) yields the following price index for intermediate goods:
Pt =
 Z 1
0
Pt(i)1 di
! 1
1 
: (9)
The intermediate-goods firms are monopolistically competitive, and they pro-
duce intermediate-goods Yt(i) employing labor Ht(i) from households. The pro-
duction function of intermediate-goods firm is
Yt(i) = Ht(i): (10)
The cost minimization problem implies
Wt = Zt; (11)
where Zt denotes the Lagrange multiplier of the cost minimization problem, and
it can be interpreted as the real marginal cost.
Intermediate goods firms set their prices subject to Calvo-type price staggered-
ness with price indexation. The price can be re-optimized at period t only with
probability 1   . Among  firms that cannot re-optimize their prices, a fraction 
firms index their prices to the past inflation t 1.
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As in Smets and Wouters (2007), under this setting, we obtain the hybrid New
Keynesian Phillips curve,
t =

1 + 
t+1 +

1 + 
t 1 + zt; (12)
where
  (1   )(1   )
(1 + ) ; and
, t and zt denote the discount factor, the log deviations from a steady state of
inflation and the real marginal cost, respectively.
2.3 Monetary policy
We assume that monetary authority follows a Taylor rule:
rt = t + qqt; (13)
where rt and qt denote the log-deviations from a steady state of Rt and Qt, respec-
tively.
If q > 0, a central bank responds to asset price fluctuations.
2.4 Equilibrium
The market clearing conditions are
Ht =
Z 1
0
Ht(i)di; (14)
S t = 1; (15)
Bt = 0: (16)
The resource constraint is
Ct = Yt (17)
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and the aggregate production function is
Yt =
1
t
Ht; (18)
where t is a measure of resource cost of price dispersion:
t 
Z 1
0
 
Pt(i)
Pt
! 
di: (19)
In this paper, we ignore eects from the price dispersion for simplicity.
We focus on a equilibrium where all monopolistic competitive firms are sym-
metric in this paper. The firm’s profits are paid out as dividends to the sharehold-
ers. For simplicity, we assume that the measure of firms is equal to the measure
of households. The dividend of intermediate-goods firms is given by
Dt = Yt   WtHt: (20)
By equation (11), the dividend is written by
Dt = (1   Zt)Yt: (21)
2.5 Linearized system
The linearized equilibrium system is given as follows:
( + )ct = wt; (22)
(ct+1   ct) = rt   t+1; (23)
qt = qt+1 + (1   )dt+1 + (t+1   rt); (24)
dt = ct   z1   zzt; (25)
wt = zt; (26)
t =

1 + 
t+1 +

1 + 
t 1 + zt; (27)
rt = t + qqt; (28)
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where the lower letters denote the log-deviations from a steady state.
As shown by Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), the dividend is given by
dt =  Azt; (29)
where
A  z(1 +  + )   1(1   z)[ + ] :
We employ an assumption on A following Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
Assumption 1. A > 0.
Under this assumption, an increase in the real marginal cost decreases the
dividend.
The equilibrium system is reduced to the following matrix form:2666666666666666666666664
1 0  0

1+ 0 0 0
1 0  (1   )A 
0 1 0 0
3777777777777777777777775
2666666666666666666666664
t+1
t
zt+1
qt+1
3777777777777777777777775
=
2666666666666666666666664
 0  q
1   1+   0
 0 0 1 + q
1 0 0 0
3777777777777777777777775
2666666666666666666666664
t
t 1
zt
qt
3777777777777777777777775
;
where
  
 + 
> 0:
The first equation is the consumption Euler equation (23); the second, the New
Keynesian Phillips curve (27); and the third, the Euler equation for share (24).
In this paper, we impose the following restriction.
Assumption 2. 1 <   2.
We make this assumption to easily prove Proposition 1. However, according
to our numerical robustness check, the result in this paper is robust even if  > 2.
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3 Main results
3.1 Results
The main results of this paper are as follows.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a necessary and sucient condition
for equilibrium determinacy is
q < 
max
q 
(   1)(1 + )
A(1   )(1   ) :
If q > maxq , there is equilibrium indeterminacy or no stationary equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix. 
Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is equilibrium indeterminacy
or no stationary equilibrium if q > maxq . A sucient condition for equilibrium
indeterminacy is
maxq < q <
2(1 + )[ + (2   )] + (4 + )
(2   )[ + 2A(1   )] :
Proof. See Appendix. 
At a limit of  = 0, the threshold maxq is the same as the threshold in Proposi-
tion 1 of Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007).
The threshold maxq depends on the fraction of price indexation firms, .
Proposition 3. maxq is increasing in .
Proof. Since  = (1 )(1 )
(1+) , we obtain
maxq =
(1   )(1   )(   1)
A(1   )(1   ) :

10
Then, in the case where the fraction of price indexation is large, equilibrium
determinacy is likely to arise even if monetary policy responds to share prices.
Especially, in the case where  = 1, equilibrium indeterminacy never arises even
if monetary policy responds to share prices.
Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, if all the firms follow price indexa-
tion,  = 1, then equilibrium indeterminacy never arise.
Proof. lim!1 maxq = 1. 
3.2 A Taylor principle interpretation
The Taylor principle establishes that a permanent increase in the inflation rate
leads to a more-than-proportionate increase in the nominal interest rate. Following
Bullard and Mitra (2002) and Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007), we interpret our results
according to this principle.
A one percentage point permanent increase in the inflation rate causes the
marginal cost to increase by (1 )(1 )
(1+) percentage point through the New Keynesian
Phillips curve. Since  = (1 )(1 )
(1+) , this can be rewritten as
(1   )(1   )
(1   )(1   ) : (30)
This decreases dividends and share prices by A(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) . The total eect on the
nominal rate is given by
   q A(1   )(1   )(1   )(1   ) : (31)
If this total response is greater than unity, the rule satisfies the Taylor principle.
If 0   < 1, then A(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) > 0. Thus, monetary policy response to share
prices weakens the total response to inflation and is a source of equilibrium inde-
terminacy. However, this eect is decreasing in  since A(1 )(1 )(1 )(1 ) > 0 is decreas-
ing in . This is because the eect of an increase in inflation on the real marginal
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cost, through the hybrid Phillips curve, is weakened. In paticular, if  = 1, then
A(1 )(1 )
(1 )(1 ) = 0 and the total eect on the nominal interest rate of inflation is .
Therefore, monetary policy response to share prices is not a source of equilibrium
indeterminacy in this case.
Under the sticky-price setting without price indexation, a fraction of firms can-
not change their prices in every period. Then, a permanent increase in inflation
implies a low real marginal cost. Under the sticky-price setting with price index-
ation, a fraction of firms that cannot re-optimize their prices indexes their prices
to the past inflation. In the long run, firms following price indexation can keep
their real marginal cost constant since the past inflation reflects this increase in
inflation. Therefore, a permanent increase in inflation does not change the real
marginal cost if all the firms that cannot re-optimize their prices follow price in-
dexation.
3.3 Numerical examples
We have the fraction of firms that follow price indexation  aects the thresh-
old of the central bank’s stance to the share prices on equilibrium indeterminacy
qualitatively. In this subsection, we investigate the quantitative eects of  on q.
For this exercise, we set the parameter values of the model as follows. The
discount factor of households, , is 0.99. The relative risk aversion, , is two.
The Frisch elasticity of labor, , is two. The central bank’s stance to inflation, ,
is 1.1. The steady-state marginal cost, z, is 0.85, which implies that the steady-
state markup is 15%. These values are taken from those employed by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2007). We set the Calvo-pricing price-stickiness parameter, , is 0.75
following the literature, which implies that firms can re-optimize their prices about
once a year.
Figure 1 shows the determinacy and indeterminacy regions.
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[Insert Figure 1]
The vertical axis means the central bank’s stance to the share price. The horizontal
axis means the fraction of firms that follow price indexation. The equilibrium
indeterminacy arises in the upper-left region. The equilibrium determinacy arises
in the lower-right region. Then, a stronger stance of the central bank to the share
prices induces equilibrium indeterminacy. However, if the fraction of firms that
follow price indexation is suciently high, equilibrium indeterminacy is not likely
to arises if monetary policy responds to share prices.
4 Concluding remarks
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) found that monetary policy response to share prices
is a source of equilibrium indeterminacy in a standard sticky-price model because
an increase in inflation implies a high real marginal cost and low share prices.
In this paper, we investigated a sticky-price model in which the New Keyne-
sian Phillips curve has a lagged inflation term caused by price indexation. We
found that if firms follow price indexation, the eect of an increase in inflation
on real marginal cost is weakened and equilibrium determinacy is likely to arise.
Moreover, equilibrium indeterminacy never arises if all the firms that cannot re-
optimize their prices follow price indexation.
Empirical results support the significance of a backward inflation term in the
New Keynesian Phillips curve. Therefore, when we discuss the relationship be-
tween asset prices and monetary policy, we must consider the type of Phillips
curve.
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Appendix
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, a necessary and sucient condition
for equilibrium determinacy is
q < 
max
q 
(   1)(1 + )
A(1   )(1   ) :
Proof. For equilibrium determinacy, just one root should be inside the unit circle
and others should be outside the unit circle. It is easily shown that one root is 1=.
The three remaining roots are the solutions of a characteristic equation:
F(x) = x3 + F1x2 + F2x + F3;
where
F1    1


qA(1   ) + ( + ) + (1 +  + q) + 

< 0;
F2    1


qA(1   ) + (1 + ) + (1 + ) + [1 + q(1 + )]

> 0; and
F3   (1 + q)

< 0:
It is shown that F(0) = F3 < 0, F0(0) = F2 > 0, and
F0(1) =   1


q[(2   )A(1   ) + (1   )] + (1   )(1   ) + (2   )(1 + )

< 0
since   2. A necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy is
F(1) = 1 + F1 + F2 + F3
=
1


(   1)(1 + )   qA(1   )(1   )

> 0:
In the case where all roots are real, it is obvious that this condition is also su-
cient.
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Next, consider the case where two roots are complex. Suppose that a  bi are
roots and a norm of M  pa2 + b2. We have
F(x) = (x   a + bi)(x   a   bi)(x   r)
= x3   (2a + r)x2 + (M2 + 2ar)x   M2r
where r is a real root in (0; 1). For equilibrium determinacy, we will show that
M2 > 1.
Since F0(x) = 3x2   2(2a + r)x + M2 + 2ar, F(x) reaches a local minimum at
x = xLmin  2a + r +
p
r2   2ar + a2   3b2
3 :
Since F0(0) < 0 and F0(1) > 0, it is shown that xLmin > 1. It suces to show that
xLmin < a for M  pa2 + b2 > 1.
The rest of this proof, we show that r < a at first. Since r < xLmin, it is obtained
that
2(r   a) <
p
r2   2ar + a2   3b2:
If r  a, we have
4(r   a)2   (r2   2ar + a2   3b2) = (r   a)2 + 3b3  0
and it is a contradiction. Then, r < a.
Finally, xLmin < a is shown as follows. A necessary and sucient condition
for xLmin < a is
p
r2   2ar + a2   3b2 < a   r:
Since r < a, this condition is reduced to
r2   2ar + a2   3b2 < (a   r)2;
and this is easily shown.

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Proposition 2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, there is equilibrium indeterminacy
or no stationary equilibrium if q > maxq . A sucient condition for equilibrium
indeterminacy is
maxq < q <
2(1 + )[ + (2   )] + (4 + )
(2   )[ + 2A(1   )] :
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 1, it is shown that F(0) < 0, F0(0) > 0,
F0(1) < 0. A condition q > maxq is necessary and sucient for F(1) < 0.
In the case where all roots are real, these conditions imply that two roots are
inside the unit circle and just one root is outside the unit circle. Then, there is
equilibrium indeterminacy. In the case where two roots are complex, there is
equilibrium indeterminacy or no stationary equilibrium.
In the rest of this proof, we show that equilibrium indeterminacy arises if
q <
2(1 + )[ + (2   )] + (4 + )
(2   )[ + 2A(1   )] :
This condition is necessary and sucient for F(2) > 0. Since F(1) < 0, there is a
real root r in (1; 2).
Suppose that a  bi are roots and a norm of M  pa2 + b2. As in the proof of
Proposition 1, we have
F(x) = (x   a + bi)(x   a   bi)(x   r)
= x3   (2a + r)x2 + (M2 + 2ar)x   M2r:
For equilibrium indeterminacy, we show that M2 < 1. To show this, we show
that there is a contradiction if M2 > 1. We obtain
F0(1) = 3   2(2a + r) + M2 + 2ar
> 2(2   r)(1   a):
If a < 1, we have F0(1) > 0 and it is a contradiction since we know F0(1) < 0.
Then, M2 < 1.
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Finally, we show that a < 1 as follows. F(x) reached a local maximum at
x = xLmax  2a + r  
p
r2   2ar + a2   3b2
3
and xLmax < 1 by F0(0) > 0 and F0(1) < 0. We have xLmax > a since
p
r2   2ar + a2   3b2 < r   a:
Then, it is shown that a < 1.

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Figure 1: Determinacy and indeterminacy regions
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price q. The horizontal axis means the fraction of firms that follow
price indexation .
20
